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VETERANS' REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS UNDER
SELECTIVE SERVICE INTERPRETATIONS
Tm approaching period of large-scale demobilization of the armed forces
directs increasing attention to the necessity of reabsorbing veterans into
civilian occupations. A policy on the problem of the returning serviceman
must serve two purposes: (1) it must prevent the employment rights of
veterans from being impaired by their enforced absence, and (2) it must
simultaneously avert.a disruption of established employment arrangements
with consequent dislocation of productive capacity. Prior to this century,
a ready solution to both these phases was offered by the vast areas of govern-
ment land available for statutory distribution I and by the more-or-less
constant need of America's expanding economy for industrial workers. By
the end of the first World War, however, the unlimited frontier had dis-
appeared as a "safety valve for veteran discontent," 2 and the var-time over-
development of industry eliminated at least temporarily the continued
1. The Continental Congress rewarded indigent soldiers of the Revolution with tracts
of land. See Hicrs, THE FEDERAL UNION (1937) 180-2. In 1862, Congress cushioned the
anticipated disruption of demobilization by extending the grant of western lands under the
Homestead Act to veterans of the Union forces. REv. STAT. § 2290 (187S), 43 U. S. C. § 162
(1940); REv. STAT. § 2304 (1875), 43 U. S. C. § 271 (1940). See Andrews, Rc-enr:apoyent and
Postwar Planning (1942) 220 ANx.u.s 186.
2. Maisel, Warriors' Return (1944) 15Q NATioN 590, 592.
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availability of economic expansion as a limitless source of employment.3
Reflecting a common belief that it was politically "impracticable to require
reinstatement in statu quo," ' Congress refused in 1918 to extend to private
employment its mandate that all federal employees be reemployed at the
salary grade they would have attained had they not entered military serv-
ice.' The failure of efforts by the scattered public and private placement
agencies which, thus ill-equipped, undertook to discover sufficient jobs I was
dramatized by the numbers of chronically unemployed veterans of World
War J.7 Amply warned, therefore, of the possible results of legislative in-
action, Congress in 1940 sought to assure the relatively few men being
inducted under the Selective Training and Service Act (for what was then
expected to be a single year of "precautionary" military training) that, in
seeking reinstatement, they would be treated as though they had merely
been on leave of absence.
Section 8 of that act 8 makes mandatory, with certain exceptions,9 the
3. See STEWART, DEMOBILIZATION OF MANPOWER, 1918-19 (Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics Bull. No. 784, 1944) passim.
4. See Comment, Mobilization for Defense (1940) 50 YALE L. J. 250, 262. In a mes-
sage to Congress on December 2, 1918, President Wilson stated: "From no quarter have
I seen any general scheme of 'reconstruction' emerge which I thought it likely we could
force our spirited business men and our self-reliant laborers to accept with due pliancy and
obedience." N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1918, p. 3, col. 2.
5. 40 STAT. 754 (1918), 39 U. S. C. § 818 (1940) (postal employees); 41 STAT. 142
(1919) (all federal civil service employees). A number of states enacted laws providing for
reinstatement of veterans in public positions. LABOR LEGISLATION OF 1919 (Bureau of Labor
Statistics Bull. No. 277 (1921) 26-8.
6. See generally HOWENSTINE, THE EcoNomIcs OF DEmOBILIZATION (1944) cc. 9, 11,
14; Howenstine, Demobilization after the First World War (1943) 48 Q. J. EcoN. 91-105;
ArTER THE WAR: 1918-1920 (Nat. Resources Planning Bd.. 1943); MOCK AND TIURBER,
REPORT ON DEMOBILIZATION (1944); Litchfield, United States Employment Service and
Demobilization (1919) 81 ANNALS 19; Moulton, Demobilization and Unemployment in CLE V3.
LAND AND SCHAFER, DEMOcRAcy IN RECONSTRUCTION (1919) 293; Provisions for Employ.
ment of Ex-Service Men (1920) 10 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 462; Hines, The Reemployment of
Veterans in SHAPING THE EcONOmic FUTURE (1945) (21 Acad. Pol. Sci. Proceedings) 197,
198.
7. "The fact that a total of more than 200,000 World War veterans were finally en-
rolled in [CCC] camps, some twenty-three years after the end of the war, is proof of the
need of a comprehensive reemployment program." Andrews, supra note 1, at 187.
8. 54 STAT. 890 (1940), 50 U. S. C. § 308 (1940) (hereinafter cited as Section 8). "The
Congress which passed the Act was far more interested in mobilization than in questions
which would arise when the war was finally won." Brown, The Veteran's Stake in Organized
Labor (1944) 56 MACHINISTS' MONTHLY J. 377. Consequently, "it is on its face a law suffer-
ing from the inevitable weakness of an afterthought." Re-employment of Veterans: Statutory
and Administrative Sanctions (1944) 4 LAWYERS GUILD REV. 40. The original Selective
Service bill, introduced by Senator Burke of Nebraska as S. 4164 on June 20, 1940 and by
Representative Wadsworth of New York as H. R. 10132 on June 21, 1940, contained no
reemployment provisions. Provisions similar to Section 8 were incorporated in the Senate
bill (S. 4164) and subsequently in the final version, H. R. 6215, but scant consideration was
given to such provisions in committee. See Hearings before Committee on Military Affairs
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reinstatement of honorably discharged veterans in their former positions or
others "of like seniority, status, and pay" and protects them against dis-
charge "without cause within one year after such restoration." 10 Disputes
on S. 4164, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940); Hearings before Connittee on Military Affairs or.
H. R. 10132,76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940).
9. See infra, pp. 436-41. The limited coverage of the statute is to be noted. Among
those who have no legal reemployment rights are conscientious objectors and members
of the Coast Guard Auxiliary and of unofficial service organizations such as the American
Field Service and the American Red Cross. Furthermore, "as a practical matter, large
segments of the Nation's working population will have no legal claim to jobs after discharge
from military service," Military Service and War-Job Clauses in Union Agrements (1942)
55 MoraL L.kB. REv. 1147, 1148. See also Couper, The Reemploynment Rights of Veterans
(1945) 23S A.x ALs 112. Colonel Paul H. Griffith, director of the Veterans' Personnel Divi-
sion, has asserted that ". . . we are making a mountain out of a molehill . . . we are not
talking about ten or twelve million who are to be reinstated in permanent jobs that they
left. lWe are talking about only 19% or 20% often or twelve million wen. Of that 19( or 20%
many thousands won't want their old jobs back." SEqioR-Y. AND IEEM5LOMMENT Or WAR
VETERANs (National Industrial Conference Board Studies in Personnel Policy, No. 65,
1944) 7. See also Evans, Preparing the Soldier for his Return to Industry in VETERA, PLACE-
MENT AND REHABILITATION (Am. Management Ass'n, 1944) 3, 16; Slichter, Filling the
Veteran into Industry (1944) 17 STATE GOVERNIMENT 462; Bolti, The Veterans' Runaround
(1945) 190 HARPER'S 385, 389; Efron, Old Jobs, or iew Ones, for the Veterans, N. Y. Times
Magazine, March 18, 1945, p. 11 ("Most veterans will not want their old jobs bac:. . .
This disposition to simplify the reinstatement problem has been assailed by organized labor.
See address by James B. Carey, Oct. 11, 1944, quoted in JOB RIGHTS Fort Vr'ErLt;s (CIO,
Supplement to EcoNomc OuTLOOK, Oct. 1944) 1, 2.
10. "Section S(b): In the case of any such person who, in order to perform such
training and service, has left or leaves a position, other than a temporary position,
in the employ of any employer and who (1) receives such certificate [indicating
satisfactory completion of service under Section 3(b) of the Act), (2) is still qualified
to perform the duties of such position, and (3) makes application for reemployment
within forty days after he is relieved from such training and service . . . [for ex-
tension of application time to ninety days see note 97 infra). "(B) if such position
was in the employ of a private employer, such employer shall restore such person to
such position or to a position of like seniority, status, and pay unless the employer's
circumstances have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do
so;...
"Section 8(c): "Any person who is restored to a position . . . shall be con-
sidered as having been on furlough or leave of absence during his period of train-
ing and service in the land or naval forces, shall be so restored without loss of Ean-
iority, shall be entitled to participate in insurance or other benefits offered by the
employer pursuant to established rules and practices relating to employees on fur-
lough or leave of absence in effect with the employer at the time such persons was
inducted into such forces, and shall not be discharged "from such position without
cause within one year after such restoration."
Section 8(b) (A) extends this protection to employees of the Federal Government.
Section 8(b) (C), while declaring it to be the "sense" of Congress that state and local gov-
ernment employees should have reemployment rights, nevertheless exempts them from the
Act's compulsory features. Similar reemployment rights were provided for retired personnel
and reserve components of the Regular Army ordered into active service. 54 STAT. 859
(1940), 50 U. S. C. § 403 (1940).
The Service Extension Act of 1941 [55 STAT. 627 (1941), 50 U. S. C. § 357 (Supp. III,
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arising under this section 11 have in general been adjudicated informally by
local draft boards 12 in terms of policies outlined by National Selective
Service Headquarters. Although that agency has no rule-making power
under Section 8,13 its statutory interpretations are important both because,
considerable reliance has been placed upon them by employers 14 and be-
cause courts may attach to them the weight of expert testimony.
1941-43) ] extended by reference the benefits of Section 8 to all who entered active military
or naval service after May 1, 1940, whether volunteers or inductees, and to federal em-
ployees whose positions were covered into the classified civil service during their absence in
the armed forces. The Civilian Reemployment of Members of the Merchant Marine Act of
1943 [57 STAT. 162 (1943), 50 U. S. C. § 1472 (Supp. III, 1941-43) ] climaxed a long con-
troversy over proposals to cover members of the maritime service under provisions similar
to Section 8. See Crucible Fuel Co., 15 WAR LAB. REP. 583 (1944). It, should be noted
that reemployment rights depend upon a showing of "substantially continuous service in
the merchant marine" and that the problem of proof may be more complicated than in the.
case of a discharged member of the armed forces.
The Women's Army Corps receives similar reemployment rights by construction of
57 STAT. 371 (1943), 50 U. S. C. § 1552 (Supp. Ill, 1941-43).
11. An aggrieved veteran's only formal recourse under the statute is litigation. See note
35 infra. Under Section 8(e), he may apply to the United States district attorney in any
district in which his former employer "maintains a place of business" to act as his attorney.
The Section appears to place considerable discretion in that official in that he need not ap-
pear for the veteran unless he is "reasonably satisfied that the person so applying is entitled
to such benefits." The federal district court trying such a suit "shall have power ... to,
specifically require such employer to comply with such provisions, and, as an incident
thereto, to compensate such persons for any loss of wages or benefits suffered by reason of
such employer's unlawful action . .. ."
12. There are voluntary, unpaid reemployment committeemen attached to the draft
boards. See SELECTIVE SERVICE REGULATIONS, § 603.81 ("Reemployment Committee-
men"); LOCAL BOARD MEMORANDUM No. 190 (March 1, 1944) pt. II, § 3; Ruar1vLoYmENr"
BULLETIN No. 1 (Sept. 29, 1943); 1 Prentice-Hall 1944 Labor Serv. 1014-D, 1022.
13. Section 8(g) instructs the Director of Selective Service to establish a "Personnel'
Division" with the dual function of assisting in the restoration to their former positions of
those entitled to the benefits of Section 8 and of establishing contact with new positions for
those who either are not covered or wish to change their employment. The name of this
agency was changed by REEMPLOYMENT BULLETIN No. I to "Reemployment Division"'
and, again, by LOCAL BOARD MEMORANDUm No. 190 to "Veterans' Personnel Division."
For an outline of the enforcement machinery see LOCAL BOARD MEMORANDUM No. 190,
supra note 12, pts. II, III, V.
14. Concern over Selective Service constructions is attested by the growing number of
advisory articles in trade and industrial journals. Among these are Rights of Returning Vets
Outlined for Job Reinstatement (July 1944) 154 IRON AGE 149; Hadlick, Discussing the Legat
Obligation of Employers in Regard to Rights of Returning Servicemen (Oct. 4, 1944) 36 NAT.
PETROLEUM NEWS 48; A. A. R. Committee Report (1944) 117 RAILWAY AGE 552 (see also,
note 44 infra); Veterans' Personnel Division to Aid Servicemen Regain Jobs (July 31, 1944)
115 STEEL 42; Taylor, From Uniforms to What? (Nov. 1944) 43 AERO DIGEST 113; Jobs for
Veterans: Coal's Obligation and Opportunities (Oct. 1944) 49 COAL AGE 86; Reemployment of'
Ex-Servicemen and Women; Obligations of Employers (1944) 13 INDUSTRIAL MEDICINE 56;
National Selective Service and Reemployment Policies (July 1944) 36 AM. WATER WoRxs,
Ass'N J. 794; What is Cause? Selective Service Rules on Job Security, Business Week, June-
17, 1944, p. 106; Ashe, What are Rights of the Veteran Returning to Prewar Position? (Sept.
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THE SPECIAL PRIVILEGES DOCTRINE
In rendering advice on the meaning of Section S, Selective Service might
have set as its aim the protection of returning veterans against prejudice by
their military service; 15 for this purpose, the granting of accumulated sen-
iority for the period of such service I" would have been sufficient. Instead, it
has sought as an appropriate reward for veterans a unique employment
equity,17 and its pronouncements both as to the veteran's reinstatement
rights and his subsequent employment status reflect this policy.
The principle of special benefits has been embodied in the "absolute
priority" formula,' s which would replace seniority 10 as the yardstick for
1944) 113 INLAND PRINTER 31; Fenton, Re-employment of War I'derans (1944) 26 PAPrr
INDUsTRY AND PAPER WORLD 498; Benge, Re-enployment of Veterans, id. at 849.
15. There is some indication in the floor discussion of the reemployment provisions that
Congress contemplated a restoration of the status quo. "SEN. DINAER: 'Is it meant ...
that if a man goes out to serve his country . . . and comes back he assumes his prior status
less one year's payment?' SEN. SHEPPARD: 'That is what this bill intends as I understand.
That is what the members of the committee thought should be and could be done.'" 86
CONG. REc. 10107 (1940). See also statement of William L. Green, president, AFL, quoted
in 86 CONG. REc. 10091-2 (1940). See also letter of August 21, 1941 addressed "to each
soldier about to return to civil life," from 'Major General Lewis B. Hershey. In Hall v.
Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 53 F. Supp. 817 (E. D. Ky. 1944), in which it upheld the
constitutionality of Section 8, a federal district court interpreted the purpose of that Section
as being "to minimize, in so far as possible, the Sacrifices of those who were required to enter
the military service by assuring them that their jobs, their pay and their status with their
employers would be held inviolate . . ." Id. at 818. For evidence of Congressional doubts
as to the feasibility and constitutionality of Section 8 see remarks of Senators Sheppard,
Barkley and Norris, 86 CoNG. REc. 1010S-9 (1940).
16. For discussion of the seniority principle see note 19 infra. It is now settled that
"seniority rights accumulate during the period of active military or naval Eervice . .. in
the same manner as [they] would have accumulated had the person remained continuously
at work in lfis civilian occupation." Loc. BOARD ,MEMOR DU11I No. 190-A, pt. IV, § 1
(May 20, 1944) (hereinafter cited as MEMORANDtM, 190-A). Until recently, however, there
was some disagreement as to whether seniority rights accrued or were frozen as of the time of
entering service. See Brecht, Collctire Bargaining and Re-enployncti of Veterans (1943)
227 AsNNALS 97; Military Serrice and War-Job Clauses in Union Agreements (1942) 55
MONTHLY LAB. REv. 1147, 1150. For an indication of the diversity of union military zerice
clauses on the seniority-accumulation question see UNION AGREE.iET-r PRoviIoS.s (Bureau
of Labor Statistics Bull. No. 5S0, 1942) passim. See also agreements summarized in (1940)
7 LAB. REL. REP. 184,229; (1941) 8 id. at 625; (1941) 9 id. at 88; (1942) 10 id. at 80.
17. This underlying premise of the Selective Service interpretations has been vigorously
emphasized by Colonel Griffith on several occasions. In a debate with Victor G. Reuther,
Director of the War Policy Division, United Automobile Workers (CIO), before the Na-
tional Industrial Conference Board on August 17, 1944, he said, in part: "I want to maize it
clear that I believe the man who served in uniform for $50 a month is due more considera-
tion by his country than the man who stayed home in the plant for $150 a wee:, and time-
and-a-half overtime." SENoRITy AND REEMPLOYMENT OF WARV VETEMNS, Op. Cit. SUPra
note 9, at 7. See also statement of Colonel John F. McDermott in which he referred to the
"muddy foxhole" to support the thesis of preferential benefits. N. Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1944,
p. 15, col 6.
18. In recent popular discussions, this phrase has been used interchangeably with
1945]
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determining the veteran's right to reemployment, and in two complementary
interpretations which give him preferential status for one year. 0 Under the
absolute priority construction, a veteran possesses an absolute claim to his
former position or one of "like . . .status and pay" without reference to
whether his reinstatement "necessitates the discharge of a non-veteran with a
greater seniority." 21 Further, since a veteran reinstated on these terms
would be vulnerable under seniority practice to lay-offs due to reduction in
force, Selective Service has construed the statutory protection against dis-
charges "without cause" for one year as an exception to the rule that length
of service governs the order of lay-offs.2 2 Finally, to forestall the neutraliza-
"super-seniority." See, e.g., What Price Glory this Time? (Oct. 1944) 30 FORTUNE 117,
258; Should Returning Soldiers Have Job Preference Over Senior Workers? (1944) 10 TowN
MEETING BULLETIN, No. 25, pp. 3,16; SENIORITY AND REEMPLOYMENT OF WAR VETERANS,
op. cit. supra note 9, at 10.
"Super-seniority" is a useful abbreviation for the veteran's seniority status after rein-
statement, since he has for one year a type of preference superior even to the top-seniority
of. union committeemen and shop-stewards in retention during lay-offs. But because sen-
iority is irrelevant to the veteran's reemployment right, it appears inaccurate to use th
word in this context, even with the prefix "super-."
19. Seniority is understood in industry as the principle whereby length of employment,
rather than merit or ability, is the gauge of preference in such aspects of employment as.
promotions, lay-offs, rehires, transfers, division of available work and choice of job or shift.
Reflecting the limitation of opportunity for advancement under the impersonal conditions ofl
large corpoiate organization, the struggle for strict seniority rules has centered, in recent
years, in mass production industries in which insecurity of tenure is promoted by seasonat
lay-offs and new technologies, and in which routinized, semi-skilled operations neutralize
differences in ability. For an extensive discussion of the seniority principle in the railroad
industry see Comment, Seniority Rights in Labor Relations (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 73. For
studies of seniority in other industries see Silver and Kassalow, Seniority in the Aintomobile
Industry (1944) 59 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 463; Marquardt and McDowell, Seniority in the
Akron Rubber Industry, id. at 792. A list of earlier studies will be found in Comment (1937)
47 YALE L. J.,.supra, at 73, n. 1. More general analyses are in SLICnTER, UNION POLICIES
AND INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT (1941) 98-163; FELDMAN, STABILIZING JOBS AND VAGES.
(1940) 196-226 (excellent inquiry into changing content of seniority concept); SENIORITY
PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES AS DEVELOPED THROUGH COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (Prince-
ton University, Industrial Relations Section, Research Report No. 63, 1941); HARISON,,
SENIORITY PROBLEMS DURING DEMOBILIZATION AND RECONVERSION (Princeton University,,
Industrial Relations Section, Research Report No. 70, 1944); Herrick, Application of Sen.
iority Provisions in THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT IN ACTION (Am. Manage-.
ment Ass'n, Personnel Ser. No. 82, 1944) 17.
20. All three interpretations were embodied in MEMORANDUM 190-A. As explained by
Colonel Griffith, this document "consisted of excerpts taken from the answers to questions.
which we had received. . . .We published the memorandum so that everyone could be-
aware of just what his responsibilities are and what rights and privileges the veteran is
entitled to when he returns." SENIORITY AND REEMPLOYMENT OF WAR VETERANS, op. cit.
supra note 9, at 2.
21. MEMORANDUM 190-A, pt. IV, § l(c).
22. See section 8(c), supra note 9. MEMORANDUM 190-A, pt. IV, § 4(b): "A veteraw
who has been reinstated to his former position cannot within one year be displaced by
another on the ground that the latter has greater seniority rights. To permit such displace-
ment would be to nullify the original reinstatement and thus deprive the veteran of his re-
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tion of these advantages by union action, it has been announced that since
"'the veteran cannot be deprived of his reemployment rights by reason of
Icollective bargaining] agreements . . . setting up conditions of employ-
ment different from those which existed at the time [he] left," 23 he will not be
bound by a closed- or union-shop contract signed in his absence or by the
inclusion of a maintenance-of-membership clause in an existing contract.
24
The preferential treatment doctrine is a natural reflection of the spon-
taneous public sentiment that every possible aid should be given to return-
ing servicemen. It is not at all clear, however, that the policy is compatible
with the reemployment statute which Selective Service purports to interpret
or with other federal laws, or that it can be consistently enforced without
arousing overwhelming opposition by large segments of labor and manage-
ment.
Legal Considerations. The special benefits policy dictates not only the
rehiring of a veteran whose seniority credits do not entitle him to restoration
but also his placement in a position more advantageous than that to which
he would have been entitled had he not been inducted. Yet all that Section 8
provides is that he be "restored to a position of like seniority, status, and
pay." 25 This language does not connote all that the preferential status
principle implies.26 It requires no more than the accrual of seniority during
the period of military duty as if the serviceman were on leave of absence.2
But a veteran reemployed, for example, in a plant whose activities have
employment rights under the Act, and would be, in effect, a repeal of an Act of Congrezo."
See also Selective Service statement quoted in Drought, Operating Prdktms in Re.emp!oyirg
Servicemen (1944) 9 ADVANCED MANAGEMENr 90, 92. The most picturesque exprezsioa of
this view is that by the executive officer of the Veteran's Personnel Division: "When cut-
backs come, you just 'cut [the veteran] out' of the cutback." Golder, RcrMplo*, crt of
Veterans (July 1944) 6 MIANAGEMENT" RECORD (National Industrial Conference Board) 179,
181. See also Super-seniority for Reinstated Vets (1944) 14 LAD. REL. REP. 314. See Re-
employment Rights of Veterans (1944) 7 NAM LAW DIGEST 17, 24 (affirming the Selective
Service construction of Section 8).
23. M1EMOR.ANDUm 190-A, pt. IV, § l(e).
24. The ground is that private contracts may not abrogate the laws of the United
States. SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM: ANNijUAL REPORT FOR 1941-42, 305-6; Ti'hat Price
Glory This Time?," supra note 18, at 260. See also Golder, supra note 22, at 180. ("If [Con-
gress] intended to limit [the right to reemployment] with a statement that the right could
not be exercised unless it was done in conformity with union rules and regulations . . . .
[it] could have so stated.")
25. Section 8(b) (B), supra note 10.
26. See circular letter from C. A. Miller, general counsel, American Short Line R. R.
Ass'n. of Oct. 6, 1944, entitled "Reemployment Rights of Veterans Under Selective Training
and Service Act of 1940": "It wnas not intended [by Congress] that [the veteran's) rights
should be enlarged by reason of his military service." Id. at 2; cf. Couper, supra note 9, at
117; Reemployment of Veterans: Statutory and Administratire Sanctions, supra note 8, at 42;
advisory opinion by H. A. Gray, arbitrator in Timken Roller Bearing Co.-United Steel
Workers of America dispute, discussed in Test of Veterans' Right to Jobs Despite Cirilian
SeniorityisDue, N. Y. Herald Tribune, April 1, 1945, § 2, p. 1, col. 2 and p. 2, col. 5.
27. See Section 8(c), supra note 10.
1945]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
been so curtailed that all others of equivalent length-of-service standing
have been laid off is not merely "restored" to his former status; he is given a
superior standing.28
The statute exempts employers from the duty to rehire when their "cir-
cumstances have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do
so."29 Yet the absolute priority principle attenuates this clause's function
as an escape more than Congress may be supposed to have intended.80 Thus,
it has been limited by Selective Service to mean that the employer's only
escape is a showing that he maintains on his payroll no non-veteran hired
after the veteran's departure in a position for which the latter is qualified. 3'
28. Compare the practice of the NLRB which, although it has a statutory mandate to
punish unfair labor practices, does not interpret the reinstatement of discriminatorily dis-
charged employees as a physical restoration in all circumstances. Thus, according to its
standard reinstatement order, workers hired after the start of the strike are to be dismissed
if necessary to provide employment for the reinstated employees; but ". . . upon reinstate-
ment the striking employees [are] to be treated in all matters involving seniority and con-
tinuity of employment as though they had not been absent from work." Republic Steel
Corp. v. NLRB, 114 F. (2d) 820, 821 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940), construing 107 F. (2d) 472 (C. C. A.
3d, 1939) (holding that the Board may not require reinstatement of a striker who has not
been replaced by another employee). In considering the validity of reinstatement orders,
the courts have frequently taken into account their economic impact. Thus an order of the
Labor Relations Board directing reinstatement of all discriminatorily discharged employees
with compensation for the period of unemployment "without regard to whether they would
have been employed for that period had there been no discrimination" is invalid. NLRB v.
American Creosoting Co., 139 F. (2d) 193 (C. C. A. 6th, 1943); cerl. denied, 321 U. S. 797
(1943); NLRB v. Lightner Publishing Co., 128 F. (2d) 237 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942) (the em-
ployee need not be reinstated when his former job has been eliminated because of business
losses); NLRB v. Somerset Shoe Co., 111 F. (2d) 681 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940) ("The order ...
does not require respondent to give present employment to more men than it needs. .. ."
Id. at 689.); NLRB v. Nelson Mfg. Co., 120 F. (2d) 444 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941) ("The plain
meaning of the order is that the ...men are to be restored to their former positions and
given work, when other like employees are given work." Id. at 446.) Cf. Union Drawn Steel
Co.-v. NLRB, 109 F. (2d) 587, 592 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940); NLRB v. Bell Oil & Gas Co., 98 F.
(2d) 405 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938).
29. Section 8(c), supra note 10.
30. Thus one early observer predicted that "reinstatement would hardly be obligatory
in the case of a necessary reduction in force." Comment, Mobilization for Defense (1940)
54 HARv. L. REv. 278, 290. There is some indication that the sponsors of the Senate bill
contemplated such a limitation. "SEN. BARKLEY: '. . . It seems to me we could not re-
quire a company to restore the employment of men who, if there had been no military serv-
ice, might have been discharged during the year because of a necessary reduction of the
company's force. . . .' " 86 CONG. REc. 10108 (1940). The analogous British-statute pro-
vides that "it shall not be treated ...as reasonable or practicable for the former em-
ployer to take the applicant into his employment ...if it can only be done by discharg-
ing some other person who . . .had been . . . employed .. . for a longer period than
the applicant." Reinstatement in Civil Employment Act, 1944, 7 & 8 Guo. VI, c. 15,
§ 5. The Canadian Reemployment Act makes "the right to reinstatement ...subject to
established rules of seniority in the employer's establishment . . ." Reinstatement in Civil
Employment Act, 1942, 6 GEo. VI, c. 31, § 3.
31. See statement of Colonel Griffith to Veterans of Foreign Wars, quoted in (1944) 15
LAB. REL. REP. 26.
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Even if it be assumed that the reemployment right is unqualified, the
further inference that there is a virtual one-year immunity against Jay-off,32
although a necessary buttress to absolute priority, is more than the statutory
exemption from discharges "without cause" requires. Such a construction
ignores a distinction .clearly understood and carefully guarded in industry,
and presumably recognized by Congress, between "discharge," an extreme
form of discipline,33 and "lay-offs," which are recognized as normal in-
cidents of business recession during which seniority rights often are retained
or accrue.
3 4
Since the cases thus far brought for reinstatement and back pay under
Section 8 have disclosed a benevolent judicial attitude towards veterans,1
32. See MIEMORANDUM 190-A, loc. cit. supra note 22. Careal, there as yet appears to be
no intention to place employers in the anomalous position of having to retain in all circum-
stances veterans whom, at least in some circumstances, they would not have ben obligated
to reemploy. Thus, closing of plant, elimination of the veteran's position and all similar
positions held by non-veterans, and change of product so as to require different skills are all
circumstances which would seem to exempt the employer from the duty to retain the veteran
for one year. See note 84 infra.
33. Collective bargaining contracts commonly enumerate permissible reasons for dis-
charge. Sample provisions will be found in UNIoN AGREEMENT PROvIsoNs (Bureau of Labor
Statistics Bull. No. 580, 1942) 138-44. Apparently on the theory that special grievance
procedures governing the discharge of all employees would be adequate to protect reinstated
veterans, few of the contracts surveyed in the last-mentioned study embodied the one-year
protection of Section 8 against discharge without cause. See also T1.e Reinstatement of
Draftees (1942) 11 LAB. REL. REP. 133.
Under union agreements, "cause" for discharge is always an act or personal characteristic
of the employee which renders him unfit for his job or constitutes a breach of employment
rules. For a list of such "causes," generally, see Reemploymnent Rights of Veterans (1944) 7
NAM LAw DIGEST 17, 26; Dash, Bargaining Through the Gricrance Precedfire in Tn CoL-
LECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT IN AcTio, (Am. Management Ass'n, Personnel Ser.
No. 82, 1944) 3, 5.
34. "Workers object to the policy of regarding a lay-off as a final termination of the
employment relationship." UNION AGREEMENT PRoVIsIONs, op. cit. supra note 33, at 125.
Hence, many union agreements provide for the accumulation of seniority in short lay-off
periods, but generally a lay-off for more than twelve months leads to loss of seniority rights.
Id. at 121. Nevertheless, even in such a situation the term "dismissal," rather than "dis-
charge," is used.
35. In one case, a federal district court held that a reinstated veteran was entitled to
back pay for the period in which his former employer had refused to reemploy him after
application, even though he had been reinstated before filing of the suit and in spite of the
fact that Section 8(e) makes the right to back pay an incident of the suit for reinstatement.
Hall v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 53 F. Supp. 817 (E. D. Ky. 1944), cited supra
note 15. In another case, involving suit for reinstatement by a company doctor whose place
had been filled in his absence, the court ordered his reinstatement, holding that "handi-
capped as [returning veterans] are bound to be by prolonged absence, such competition
[with employees who have replaced them] is not part of a fair and just system... ." Kay v.
General Cable Corp., 144 F. (2d) 653, 656 (C. C. A. 3d, 1944). See infra, p. 438. But the
reemployment provisions will not protect a member of the armed forces against the invoca-
tion of a termination clause in an employment contract by the employer. Wright v. Weaver
Bros., Inc., 56 F. Supp. 595 (D. C. Md. 1944) (action for declaratory judgment under the
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it is conceivable that the special privileges gloss on the statute will be ratified
by the courts as an amendment to other federal laws governing employment
relations." But the alternative possibility that this doctrine may be de-
feated by its conflict with such laws is strengthened by three considerations:
the fact that no case involving a direct clash between absolute priority and
seniority has yet come to trial, the likelihood that current judicial rationali-
zations of privileged status will be soberly reconsidered as the reemploy-
ment problem grows more complicated, 3 and the apparently tenuous legal
status of Selective Service interpretations.3 8 Whatever the ultimate fate of
Army Reserve and Retired Personnel Law of 1940, 54 STAT. 858 (1940), 50 U. S. C. § 403
(1940), which granted to reserve officers reinstatement rights similar to those tinder Sec-
tion 8). The court said, in part: "The right of reemployment ...by virtue of the statute,
is ...in derogation of the common law, and therefore must be strictly construed and not
extended by implication or by liberal interpretation." Id. at 600.
36. If Section 8 is considered in essence as a legislative grant of compensation to vet-
erans, the cost of which must be distributed among the rest of the community, it may be
argued that compliance should exempt employers from liability under labor laws or con-
flicting provisions of union agreements. From this point of view, the reemployment provi-
sions are analogous to workmen's compensation lairs. The judicial practice of giving an
extended and liberal interpretation to such statutes is almost universal. W. J. Newman Co.
v. Industrial Commission, 353 II. 190, 187 N. E. 137 (1933); Jensen v. So. Pacific Co.,
215 N. Y. 514, 109 N. E. 600 (1915); Burke v. 'Industrial Commission, 368 I11. 554, 15
N. E. (2d) 305 (1935); So. Pacific Co. v. Sheppard, 112 F. (2d) 147 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940)
(construing Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act). But
cf. Smith v. Wilson Foundry & Machinery Co., 296 N. W. 654 (1941). See also 3 SUTInuRLAND,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (3d ed. 1943) § 7206 and cases cited in § 6604, n. 7.
37. See infra, p. 4 39.
38. See supra, p. 420. Selective Service concedes that "interpretation of the meaning
and significance of [the reemployment] provisions is, in the last analysis, a matter for deter-
mination by the courts." MEMORANDUM 190-A, § 1. Informal interpretations, such as
those in Memorandum 190-A, on the part of administrative agencies ordinarily carry little
weight in the courts. Helvering v. New York Trust Co., 292 U. S. 455 (1934). Similar con-
siderations hold when the agency issuing interpretations has no implied or express statutory
authority so to do. United States v. Stewart, 311 U. S. 60 (1940).
Yet the NAM's Law Department has advised its members that Selective Service inter-
pretations "although not binding on the courts, will unquestionably be given great weight
by them." Reemployment Rights of Veterans, supra note 33, at 21. In support, the Law
Department cites ICC v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 310 U. S. 534 (1940),
which involved interpretations of the MOTOR CARRIER ACT [49 STAT. 543 (1935) 49 U. S. C.
§ 301 (1940) ] issued by the I.C.C. and in which the Court stated that "such interpretations
are entitled to great weight" (id. at 549), and Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United
States, 288 U. S. 294 (1933) where it was held that "the practice [of an administrative
agency] has peculiar weight when it involves a contemporaneous construction of a statute
by the men charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion, of making
the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new." Id. at 315.
But quaere whether the issuance of an interpretation of Section 8 three and one-half years
after its enactment constitutes "a contemporaneous construction," especially since manage-
ment and labor had in the interim worked out a different interpretation (reinstatement on an
accrued seniority basis) and embodied it in contracts? May not the inaction of Selective
Service in that period be considered an abdication to management and the unions of the
duty to interpret Section 8? Such failure of administrative agencies to assert authority has
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the Selective Service policy, 9 it seems likely that an employer in a union
shop who lays off or downgrades a union member in order to rehire a veteran
would be exposed to the charge of attacking the union, under cover of the
reemployment statute, in violation of the Wagner Act.40 Even if the em-
ployer could vindicate the reinstatement of a non-union veteran with inferior
been held to be "significant in determining whether such puwer -as actually confenrd.-
Federal Trade Commission v. Bunte Bros., 312 U. S. 349, 352 (1941). See also Hennesy v.
Personal Finance Corp., 176 Misc. 201, 26 N. Y. S. (2d) 1012 (1941). Moreover, the fact
that absolute priority cannot be uniformly applied (as when the absolute priorities of two
veterans to a given job conflict, see note 65 infra, may diminish its force as statutory in-
terpretation. Lack of uniformity in such interpretations has been held to be sufficient
groun& for rejecting them as statutory guideposts. Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285
U. S. 1 (1932); McCann v. Retirement Board, 331 Ill. 193, 162 N. E. 859 (1928J. See 2
SUTHERLANo, STATUTORY CoNsrRcrIoN (3d ed. 1943) §§ 5103-5103 and cases therein cited.
For discussions of the problem of the weight to be accorded administrative interpreta-
tions see generally Lee, Legislatire and Interpretire Regulations (1940) 29 GEO. L. J. 1; Feller,
Addendum to the Regulations Problem (1941) 54 HvRV. L. REv. 1311; Griswold, A Su.mary
of lhe Regulatiozs Problem, id. at 39S.
39. As to the possibility of judicial relief for an aggrieved senior employee, there are
some square holdings in state courts that seniority rights are "property" the contravention
of which entitles their holder to injunctive relief. Evans v. Louisville & N. R. R., 191 Ga.
395, 12 S. E. (2d) 611 (1940); Bradford v. Kurn & Lonsdale, 235 Mo. App. 1282, 146 S. IV.
(2d) 644 (1940) (failure of trustees in bankruptcy to recall a laid-off employee in accordance
with contractual seniority rights gives employee a cause of action); Ledford v. Chicago, M.,
St. P. & Pac. R. R., 298 Ill. App. 298, 18 N. E. (2d) 568 (1939); Gleason v. Thomas, 117
XV. Va. 550, 1S6 S. E. 304 (1936); Grand International Brotherhood v. Mills, 43 Ariz. 379,31
P. (2d) 971 (1934). But the traditional reluctance of equity specifically to enforce con-
tracts for personal service may be a bar to injunction. Shaup v. Grand International Broth-
erhood, 223 Ala. 202, 135 So. 327 (1931); Gore v. Pennsylvania R. R., 144 Misc. 639, 259
N. Y. Supp. 410 (Sup. Ct. 1932). Furthermore, seniority rights are alienable. Yazoo & M.
V. R. R. v. Mitchell, 173 Miss. 594,161 So. 860 (1935).
In the federal courts, seniority has been called "property," but only to protect the right
to a hearing under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Estes v. Union Terminal
Co., 89 F. (2d) 768 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937); Nord v. Griffin, 86 F. (2d) 481 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936),
cert. denied, 300 U. S. 673 (1937); Griffin v. Chicago Union Station, 13 F. Supp. 722 (N. D.
Ill. 1936). For a similar limitation in a state court, see Watson v. Missouri-K.-T. R. R., 173
S. IV. (2d) 357 (Te.. Civ. App. 1943). Thus a recent opinion by counsel for the Railway
Brotherhoods [' MEMORA.ND'um RE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 8 OF THE SELEcTI E SrV-
IcE AcT, XVmicH CoxcERnxs REEMPLOTIIENT RIGHTs OF VERANS, 1944] stating that abzo-
lute priority "contemplates a taking of vested property rights ... without compenation"
and "that such a taking would be lacking in due process" [id. at 71 is supported only in its
procedural aspects by federal court decisions. A similar inclination to read unwarranted
implications into the seniority cases was displayed by Philip Murray in a splech in which he
interpreted the Griffin case as declaring seniority to be "property." Cited infra note 53.
See also Seniority or Super-seniorityfor Veterans (1944) 15 LAn. REL. REP. 25.
40. It is perhaps significant that an early Senate draft of the Selective Service Act
made refusal of an employer to reinstate a returning veteran "an unfair labor practice
within the meaning of and for all purposes of the National Labor Relations Act" and pro-
vided for recourse to the federal courts only where there was no remedy under the latter
statute. SEN. REP. No. 2002, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940). See remarks of Senator Danaher
of Connecticut in 86 CONG. REc. 10107 (1940). It may be argued that the deletion of these
provisions indicates a Congressional intent that the NLRB should not interfere with rein-
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seniority standing on the ground of good-faith reliance on administrative
interpretations, 41 he would still have to prove that such rehiring necessitated
the elimination of a union member. Since the NLRB will probably be alert
to scotch evasions of the Wagner Act under the guise of compliance with
Section 8, it might be very difficult for such an employer to satisfy the Board
that he had not discriminated against a dismissed employee as a union
statement of veterans. See Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U. S.
294 (1933); United States v. Great Northern Ry., 287 U. S. 144 (1932). But it appears from
remarks of Senator Gurney, who presented the amendment to delete the NLRA section, that
it was intended only to bring the Act into harmony with the National Guard Act of 1940
(54 STAT. 859 (1940), 50 U. S. C. § 403 (1940) ]. 86 CONG. REc. 16659 (1940). 0
Section 8 (3) of the Wagner Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer
"by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization." 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 158 (1940).
From the outset, the NLRB has treated disregard of seniority rules as a major element of
proof of a discriminatory purpose in dismissals, Segall-Maigen, Inc., 1 N.L.R.B. 749 (1936);
Brown Shoe Co., 1 NLRB 803 (1936); Maryland Distilling Co., Luchenbach Steamship
Co. 8 N.L.R.B. 1280 (1938); Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co., 9 N.L.R.B. 1073 (1938); and
also in reinstatements, Washington Mfg. Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 970 (1938); American Rolling
Mill Co., 43 N.L.R.B. 1020 (1942). In NLRB v. Gallup American Coal Co., the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a finding of discrimination where layoffs contravened sen-
iority rules. 131 F. (2d) 665 (C. C. A. 10th, 1942), enforcing 32 N.L.R.B. 823 (1941); accord,
Triplex Screw Co. v. N.L.R.B. 117 F. (2d) 858 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941) aff. and rood. 25 N.L.R,B,
1126 (1940). The Board has imposed a length-of-service standard in reinstatements. Tim-
ken Silent Automatic Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 335 (1936). Suppose the NLRB should issue a cease-
and-desist order against the reemployment of a non-union veteran in violation of a closed-
shop agreement. Quaere whether the U. S. Supreme Court's dictum in Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. v. NLRB [313 U.S. 146,155 (1941) ] that "after such an order the employer may
not be compelled by any other agency of the government to perform any acts inconsistent
with that order" would deter Selective Service. See National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309
U. S. 350, 365 (1940). Again, if a veteran should be upheld by a federal district court in his
claim to reinstatement after bringing suit under Section 8(e), would the NLRB be estopped
from taking jurisdiction? See Mason Manufacturing Co., 15 N.L.R.B. 295 (1939) (". . .
the respondent may not avoid its obligations under the terms of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act and nullify the rights of employees guaranteed by Congress through reliance on a
decree or findings made in a private suit to which the Board was not a party." Id. at 315.)
The Wagner Act provides that the "power [to prevent unfair labor practices) shall be ex-
clusive . . § 10(e), (f).
41. The principle of non-liability for compliance in good faith with an administrative
interpretation has a little support in the cases. See La Bourgogne, 210 U. S. 95 (1908). But
cf. Long v. Thompson, 177 Wash. 296, 31 P. (2d) 908 (1934); State v. Foster, 22 R. 1. 163,
46 AtI. 833 (1900); Hamilton v. People, 57 Barb. 625 (N. Y. 1870). It has been defended in a
discussion of the Securities and Exchange Commission's informal advisory interpretations
to which it is urged that great weight be attached on the grounds that (1) they are "made by
experts in the field of finance" and (2) "it would be unreasonable, in view of the complexity
of the Securities Act, for a court to impose upon an individual the burden of outguessing a
commission of experts as to what its provisions mean." Comment (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1076,
1079. See also Comment (1940) 49 YAE L. J. 1250, 1276; Certainty in the Construction of
the Law (1935) 21 A. B. A. J. 19. But quaere whether Section 8 is so complex or Selective
Service sufficiently expert in employment problems to justify the application of these argu-
ments to that agency's interpretations.
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member. Again, the reinstatement of a veteran at the expense of a senior
worker would be, in the many industries in which internal grievance machin-
ery and mixed tribunals are provided by contract 42 or statute, 43 a signal for
the filing of a complaint; in the railroad industry, for example, in which the
seniority principle has been almost uniformly sustained by the National
Railroad Adjustment Board,44 such action would almost certainly expose
the operators to liability to injured employees. Moreover, in implementing
absolute priority with the exemption from union membership, Selective
Service appears to have violated the settled NLRB rule that failure to join
an appropriate bargaining agency in a closed or union shop is cause for dis-
charge under the Wagner Act 45 as well as the WVLB policy against per-
mitting exceptions to union-security provisions in favor of returning vet-
erans.-4 6 Finally, since decisions of the MLB are not subject to judicial
review, it is probable that not even a judicial validation of the special privi-
leges doctrine would exonerate an employer from punitive action by that
agency for contravention of seniority or union-security clauses in contMctsY
42. See generally Note (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 496. See also Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co.,
11 WAR LAB. REP. 250 (1943) ("In accordance with . . . sound industrial relations prac-
tice, disputes concerning . . . military furloughs should be subject to established grievance
procedure . . . despite company's claim that . . . Selective Service Act makes adequate
provision for [their] disposition in court.. . ..." Ibid.) Extensive abstracts of Eeniority
clauses may be found in UNION AGREEMENT PRovisioNs, op. cit. supra note 33, at 117-124;
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING DEVELOPMENTS AND REPRESENTATIVE UNION AGREEMENTS
(Natio'nal Industrial Conference Board Studies in Personnel Policy, No. 60, 1944) 7-s1.
An outline of grievance adjustment and arbitration arrangements is contained in Umo.
AGREEMENT PROVISIONS, supra, at 145-61.
43. See, e.g., THE RAImwAY LABOR AcT, 48 STAT. 1189 (1934), 45 U. S. C. § 153 (1940).
44. As to the possibility of liability to senior employees in the railroad industry, see
warning by C. A. Miller, supra note 26, at 3; REPORT ON REEmPLOYM.ENT OF Ex-SERvIcE-
MEN AND WOMEN (A. A. R. Comm. for Study of Transportation, June 1944) 4; Couper, TI:r
Re-employment Rights of Veterans (1945) 238 ANNALS 112, 118; Robertson, Rail Men Will
Not Yield Seniority (1944) 117 RAILWAY AGE 591.
45. Under a proviso to Section 8(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, an employer
may require membership in a union as a condition of employment "if such labor organiza-
tion is the representative of the employees as provided in Section 9 (a), in the appropriate
collective bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made." 49 STAT. 452 (1935),
29 U. S. C. § 158 (1940). Refusal to join such a union is cause for discharge. Rosedale
Knitting Co., 20 N. L. R. B. 326 (1940). Correlatively, a discharge under a closed-shop con-
tract because of employee's failure to join a union which was an appropriate bargaining
agency does not violate the Wagner Act. Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. N. L. R. B., 115
F. (2d) 414 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940).
46. See Ohio Falls Dye and Finishing Works, 16 WAR LAB. REP. 131 (1944), sum-
marized in (1944) f4 LAB. REL. REP. 424.
47. The War Labor Board was established by Executive Order No. 9017 issued on
Jan. 12, 1942, under the First War Powers Act. 55 STAT. 8338 (1941), 50 U. S. C. § 601
(Supp., 1941). Hence its orders are in theory declarations of the President, who cannot be
sued if he acted within his powers. See Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137 (U. S. 1803).
Should the WLB be abolished or assume a different form after the war, this possibility
would, of course, be eliminated.
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It appears, then, not only that preferential reemployment benefits are not
required by the terms of Section 8 but also that they contradict other labor
laws and may subject employers to conflicting legal duties. It remains to
be seen whether they are supported by practical considerations.
Policy Considerations. Although the doctrine of special benefits will not
undergo a thorough pragmatic test until the period of mass rehiring to follow
demobilization, a tentative analysis in terms of its probable impact on
labor, returning veterans, and industry reveals serious practical defects.
From the point of view of organized labor, the absolute priority formula in
rehiring, the virtual immunity to lay-offs, and the one-year exemption from
union membership pose a threefold threat to union security. Seniority
rights are inseparably identified with collective bargaining, and a recurring
recruiting theme in recent years has been that job security depends upon
these rights.48 Hence, the apparent protection of 'veterans against seniority
rules in reinstatement and lay-offs, along with the general implication that
their job tenure is guaranteed outside the union fold, 49 may bring back into
48. The dependence of seniority on contract in the railroad industry is emphasized by a
federal circuit court decision that the Railroad Adjustment Board may not give retroactive
effect to a seniority clause in the contract. Dahlberg v. Pittsburgh & Lake Eric R. R., 138
F. (2d) 121 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943).
For a caveat against a too ready identification of seniority with security see FELDMAN,
STABILIZING JOBS AND WAGES (1940) 224; Cottrell, The Seniority Curse (Nov. 1939) PER-
SONNEL JOURNAL 178-180; BROWN, SENIORITY PROBLEMS DURING DEMOBILIZATION AND
REcONVERSION: FORWARD (Princeton University, Industrial Relations Section, Research
Report No. 70, 1944) 3. But cf. DuNLo', WAGE DETERmINATION UNDER TRADE UNION S
(1944) 36-7 (In periods of unemployment "the older workers will attempt to protect them-
selves by seniority.")
49. In February, 1944, a Selective Service spokesman stated that a reinstated veteran
would be entitled to all of the advantages, but immune to all the liabilities accruing to his
position in his absence. Rights of Veterans on Reinstatement (1944) 13 LAD. REL. REP. 746.
Inferentially, union membership is such a "liability." See note 24 supra.
To combat this suggestion, many unions have remitted dues of members in service,
waived initiation fees, and sought to obtain preferential treatment in contracts. Com-
munication to YALE LAW JOURNAL from George Meany, secretary-treasurer, AFL, Nov. 17,
1944. The action of the International Association of Machinists (AFL) in waiving entry
fees is typical. 1AM Waives Initiation Fees from Veterans (1944) 14 LAD. REL. REP. 83.
But the theory of union autonomy may lead to wide diversity in the concessions of affiliated
AFL unions. Thus, Daniel J. Tobin, president, Teamsters' Union, has instructed tile locals
that servicemen must continue to pay dues. Union Members in Army Required to Pay Dues
to Retain Full Rights (1944) 14 LAB. REL. REP. 55. Compare letter from Philip Murray,
president of the CIO, pointing out that the CIO had exempted all of its members in the
armed forces from the payment of dues while in the service and urging the unions to exon-
erate other veterans from the payment of initiation fees. Quoted in (June 1944) 1 Tn
NEW VETERAN (National CIO War Relief Committee) 4. The UAW-CIO constitution has
long provided for the waiver of initiation and reinstatement fees for servicemen. As to the
possibility, however, of a major struggle over the financial obligations of union membership,
compare assertion by R. J. Thomas, president of the UAW-CIO, that those who propose
relaxation of union rules really mean that the "unions should lie down and die" [N. Y.
Times, April 7, 1944, p. 13, col. 1] with rhetorical plea of Representative Stewart that
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industry men less susceptible to organization than formerly. Moreover, the
concept of union security presupposes a stable working force. 9 Any r&
employment formula, such as absolute priority, which discriminates against
high-seniority workers would promote turnover in plant personnel. This
would in turn decimate union membership. Should new elections be called
by the NLRB,51 the unions would need to wage again-particularly in such
recently unionized industries as automobiles and industrial chemicals *-
the hard-won struggle for recognition as exclusive bargaining agents. The
task of organization, this time, would be amplified by the veterans' expecta-
tions of a special employment equity ostensibly greater than that which the
unions, in insisting upon their subjection to seniority rules, will offer, as well
as by an already articulate anti-union bias among servicemen.ss Conse-
"in the name of high heaven let us not have this CIO . .. making our soldiers pay union
dues, fees, tribute when they return from service." 90 Cong. Rec., Sept. 7, 1944, at 7680.
In view both of the limited coverage of Section S (see note 9 supra) and of the several
statutory loopholes available to employers for evading the duty to reinstate former em-
ployees (see infra, p. 436), proposals for granting "synthetic" seniority to veterans not
previously employed and for making more flexible seniority rules applicable to handicapped
veterans have great potential value. See UAW Conrention Acts on Strikes, Veterans (1944)
15 LAB. REL. REP. 87; MIEO To ALL UAW-CIO LOCAL Uxions RE: VETRANs' SEN;-
ioniTy (National UAV-CIO War Veterans Committee, Aug. 31, 1944); RESOLUTIONS OF
THE STETH CIO CONVENTION (Philadelphia, Nov. 1-5, 1943) 15; SEVENTH CIO CONVEN-
TION, RESOLUTION ON VETERANS (Chicago, Nov. 22, 1944); HARBISON, Op. cit. sfpra note 19,
at 12-15; BAKER, THE READJUSTMENT OF MANPOWER IN INDUSTRY DURING THE Trnuusi-
T O N FROM WAR TO PEACE (Princeton University, Industrial Relations Section, Research
Report No. 71, 1944) 87-98; Shishkin, Organized Labor and the Veteran (1945) 238 AxNi'ALs
146.
50. For a close analytical study of the membership function of trade unions Wee DuN-
LOP, op. cit. supra note 48, at 33-44.
51. "When it is demonstrated that servicemen have returned to their employment in
sufficient numbers so that they comprise a substantial percentage of the employees in an
appropriate unit in which we have certified a collective bargaining representative, a new
petition for the investiation and certification of a bargaining agent may be filed wAth the
Board. In this manner employees in the armed forces who were unable to cast a vote will
be afforded an opportunity to affirm or change the bargaining agent selected in their ab-
sence." Mline Safety Appliances Co., 55 N. L. R. B. 1190, 1194 (1944). Employees in the
armed forces may vote in elections for union representatives, but only if they appear at the
polls. Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Corp., 58 N. L. R. B., No. 247 (Oct. 26, 1944). Suppose
a returning veteran is unacceptable to the union because of previous conduct. It has been
held that a union under a closed-shop contract may not be required to accept a strike-
breaker. Shinskyv. Tracey, 226 ,Mass. 21,114 N. E. 957 (1917).
52. Complete accounts of agreements reached since 1942 in these and other industries
are contained in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING DEVELOPMENTS AND REPRESENTATIVL-- UoIo.
AGREEMENTS, 1OC. cit. supra note 36.
53. "The army is everywhere reported as rabidly anti-labor." Kingsley, et erans,
Unions and Jobs: II. Labor and the Veteran (1944) 111 NEw REPUBLIC 621. See aLso The
Vets and Postwar Democracy (1944) 111 NEw REPUBLIC 272. For an indication of the
level on which this sentiment may be exploited, see remarks of Representative Steart:
"Whom of you favor the paying of tribute by our armed forces to a group of foreign-born
self-appointed labor leaders?" 90 Cong. Rec., Sept. 7, 1944, at 76S0. For the direction of
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quently, even the temporary exception to seniority practice which would
permit the return of non-union veterans might suffice to wipe out a union
majority. The apprehensions of organized labor are enhanced, finally, by
the possibility already noted 54 that hostile employers will by-pass the
Wagner Act by selectively hiring anti-union veterans and firing union mem-
bers.55
In addition to jeopardizing union security, absolute priority may have
the further effect of discriminating unfairly against non-veteran employees
who perform operations for which returning veterans are qualified." Thus,
for example, a veteran who was drafted from a plant because he was readily
organized labor's response to this tactic, see address by Philip Murray before the VFW's
45th Annual Encampment, Chicago, Aug. 22, 1944; Brown, The Veteran's Stake in Or-
ganized Labor (1944) 56 MACHINISTS' MONTHLY J. 377; A New Anti-Labor Whopper (Sept.
1944) 51 AM. FEDERATIONIST 32; Anti-Union Drive Seeks to Pit Vets Against Non-Vets
(Nov. 1944) WORK (Catholic Labor Alliance) 5; Vet-Worker Unity Vital in Post-War World,
CIO News, Nov. 13, 1944, p. 91; Silvey, Labor's Viewpoint on Veterans' Reemployment in
EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITY FOR VETERAN REEMPLOYMENT (Am. Management Ass'n,
Personnel Ser. No. 83, 1944). "The [absolute priority] interpretation is a false and mislead-
ing appeal to veterans the result of which could prejudice them against organized labor and
divide the working people of the country . . ." Seniority of Veterans (Resolution Submitted
to National Convention by UAW-CIO War Veterans' Committee, Sept. 18, 1944). "Dc-
spite malicious attempts to divide the American people on the home front from their sons
and brothers on the fighting fronts, this unity has not been broken." SEVENTH CIO CoN-
VENTION, loc., ft. supra note 49. A unanimous resolution of the National UAW-CIO Vet-
erans' Conference held in Washington in April 1944 stated that large segments of industry
and some agencies of the government were seeking to~shift the responsibility for failure to
plan for full employment by creating the myth of "a conflict of economic interest between
working people who are in the armed forces and working people who are civilians," Quoted
in Kingsley, Veterans, Unions and Jobs (1944) 111 NEW REPUBLIC "513, 514. Compare
resolution of Australasian Council of Trade Unions that preference in employment for
veterans would not be in the best interest of the country, as it would shift the focus from the
real issue of jobs for all. Protection of Veterans in Australia (1944) 59 MONTHLY LAD. REV.
759.
54. See supra, pp.427-9.
55. "Some [durable goods companies and public utilities surveyed] think, and a few
apparently hope, that enforcement of reemployment provisions of the Draft Law will pro.
duce a knock-down and drag-out fight between management and labor in which manage-
ment, aided by Selective Service and the law, will come out on the long end," A SuRvuy OF
EMPLOYER POLICIES ON REEMPLOYMENT OF VETERANS (Bureau of National Affairs Hand-
book No. 4, 1944) 5. It has been suggested that the appeasement of veterans with a re-
employment bonus would weaken the most potentially effective force for public works to
supplement private enterprise in a period of less than full employment. See BAKER, op. eit.
supra note 49, at 77.
56. The Seventh Constitutional Convention of the CIO deplored "the action of certain
administrative officials who have promoted the illusion among veterans that their way of
securing jobs is through displacing workers with longer seniority." PROCEEDINGS, Chicago,
III., Nov. 22, 1944. In a letter to employers and unions, the American Veterans of World
War II attacked the rule of absolute priority on the ground that it "rob[s] Peter to pay
Paul." Veterans Body's "No" to Superseniority (1944) 15 LAB. REL. REP. 198. See also re-
marks of Charles J. McGowan of the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers AFL
quoted in Labor (Railway Brotherhoods newspaper), Sept. 23, 1944, p. 2, col. 7.
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replaceable would downgrade an employee who was deferred because of
superior technical sidll in war productionY
Even assuming that the objective of special privileges for veterans at the
expense of others in the working community is sound, the methods pro-
pounded by Selective Service seem unadapted to the achievement of this
limited aim. While affording to the veteran specific immunities for a limited
period,' s in the long run such methods do not protect him against seniority
rules, union reprisal, the consequences of union defeat, the limited oppor-
tunities of the position to which he is reinstated, or inconsistent application
of the methods themselves. Management, in seeldng to mitigate the disrup-
tions of orderly personnel practices, may well come to lean heavily upon
seniority whenever feasible 9 Where this occurs the reinstated veteran will
become subject, at the end of one year, to the very seniority rules which he
has hitherto contravened.c0° A union which has retained a voting majority
in a dosed or union shop, might then, because of mutual distrust cultivated
during the veteran's year of privileged independence, impose the legal sanc-
tion of refusing to admit him to membership and thus bring about his dis-
charge for "cause." 61 If, on the other hand, an inflt of unorganized vet-
erans should eliminate the established union, the former would share equally
with all employees the loss of benefits attributable to collective bargaining.
57. A summary enumeration of the groups who might be adversely affected by con-
travention of seniority rules will be found in EFFECT OF CERTAIN PROVISIO. ZS OF SELECTIVE
SERVICE LOCAL BOARD MIEmORANDU. No. 190-A ON THE SENIORITY SYSTEM (memorandum
prepared by Veterans Bureau, War Policy Division, UAWV-CIO, 1944). See also Rvwc
AND WVILLIAmS, VETERANS RELNSTATEMENT AND SENIORITY RIGHTs (National War Labor
Board, Research and Statistics Report No. 28, 1944) 14.
58. For summary of these immunities see supra, pp. 422-3.
59. It is difficult to perceive any valid basis for the dire prediction that the absolute
priority formula "would Teck existing union seniority systems" Omar v. Ketchum, Na-
tional Legislative Representative, VFW, quoted in Labor (Railway Brotherhoods news-
paper), Aug. 26, 1944. See also Carey, supra note 9, at 1-3; Murray, lec. cit. supra note 53;
EFFECT OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF SELECTIVE SERVICE LOCAL BoARD MEnoRANDun No.
190-A ON THE SENIORITY SYSTEM, loe. cit. supra note 57. The traditional averzion of em-
ployers to the seniority system as an intrusion on the right to hire and fire and a deterrent to
working efficiency has given way to general acceptance in recent years. See Herrici:, App!i-
cation of Seniority Provisions in THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT I ACTIO. (Am.
Management Ass'n, Personnel Ser. No. 82, 1944) 17; Comment, 47 YALE L. J. 73, 97-8;
Seniority Provisions in Union Agreements (May 1941) 52 MONTHLY LA. REV. 1167. While
the NLRB's generalization that "seniority is prima fade a relevant criterion of fitnes"
[Timken Silent Automatic Co., 1 N. L. R. B. 335, 346 (1936) ] may be questioned, manage-
ment has found it practical to identify seniority with job status. See Seniority: A Vetno to
Government (May 1944) 102 FACTORY MANAGEMENT AND M' AINTEN.NCE 82.
60. That Selective Service anticipates such an impasse is indicated by the phrasing of its
interpretation: a reinstated veteran "cannot within one year be displaced by another. .. "
MEMORANDUM 190-A, pt. IV, § 4(b) (emphasis supplied). The alternative possibility that
the veteran will be permitted by management and the unions at the end of one year "to
maintain the job status secured by legal protection" is suggested in HAnrnso:., op. cit. svpra
note 19, at 11.
61. See cases cited supra note 45.
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Whether or not the veteran is eventually disciplined by the union or the em-
ployer, he may suffer a profound vocational loss in that the excessive em-
phasis of the Selective Service construction on the "security" of his former
employment may discourage him from seeking other opportunities perhaps
more consonant with newly-acquired abilities.62 Moreover, the granting of
absolute priority to some invites a sharp restriction in the number of vet-
erans who will possess reinstatement rights. Anyone who replaces "a per-
son entering service" has, according to Selective Service, "no reemploy-
ment rights even though he subsequently enters service," " for his job was a
"temporary" one within the meaning of one exclusory clause in Section 8.04
The assignment of temporary and ineligible status to replacements of in-
ducted employees and permanent status to substitutes for resigning em-
ployees appears to be grounded on the theory that so long as the original
incumbent of a position remains in the armed forces he retains a vested
right against all subsequent holders. Yet it not only ignores the war-time
changes which have almost everywhere erased the lines of contact between
the original job and its holder, but reduces the reemployment rights of many
servicemen to a haphazard chance.65 Thus it seems that the special privi-
leges policy would provide a year's hot-house security for some veterans,
only to lead them into a blind-alley, while, by postulating an absolute job-
right for some, it would eliminate the reinstatement claim of others.
The special benefits program has been challenged by management, too, on
the ground that it will upset orderly employment practices, promote turn-
62. But careat, the hiring of a veteran who has acquired new skills in other than "a
position of like . . . status and pay" entails no rights or duties under Section 8. Thus, an
offer to a veteran of an apparently better job than his former may be a method of evading the
statute. For detailed discussion of related techniques of avoidance see infra, pp. 436-41.
63. MEMORANDUM 190-A, pt. III,§ 4(b). The same paragraph, however, recognizes
that "there may be exceptions to this" rule.
64. Section 8(b), supra note 10. For the potential use of this clause as a device for
minimizing the duty to rehire, see infra, pp. 440-1.
65. Under the Canadian statute, a subsequent holder of a position would have a rein-
statement right so long as the previously inducted employee had not been reinstated. 6 Gao.
VI, c. 31, § 4(e) (1942).
A serious correlative criticism of absolute priority is that it would make the choice
between two veterans with conflicting job-claims, in many cases, arbitrary and fortuitous.
For example, if two men had been employed in a plant on similar operations before their
induction, the one first discharged from the armed forces would be entitled to reinstatement
even though one of the operations had in the meantime been eliminated; the other, later de-
mobilized, would have no right to displace him, regardless of previous company seniority.
This result, no matter now inequitable, would seem to be necessitated by the Selective Serv-
ice pronouncement that a reinstated veteran "cannot within one year be displaced by
another on the ground that the latter has greater seniority rights." See note 22 supra. It is
conceivable that the pronoun "another" was not intended to include a veteran seeking
reinstatement to a job held by a previously reemployed veteran with lower seniority stand-
ing. But this inference would hardly accord with the evident design of Selective Service to
provide a year's job security for the one first rehired. See MEMORANDUM 190-A, pt. IV,
§ 4(a).
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over, increase the burden on training facilities and damage productive
efficiency." Although any scheme of compulsory reinstatement-even the
more limited one of rehiring on the basis of accumulated seniority rights cri-
would probably arouse similar misgivings, and although no comprehensive
study in support of these criticisms has yet appearedCP there are certain
industrial situations in which absolute priority would palpably be more
disruptive than the suggested alternative of straight seniority. Thus it
seems likely that the application of the Selective Service formula to plants
which have lost much personnel to the armed forces and which will have
undergone major production cutbacks would, in addition to exposing man-
agement to incompatible legal duties,c° require a wholesale reconstitution of
the work force and the elimination of highly-skilled senior employees.
66. See, e.g., Seniority: A fenw to Government, supra note S9, at 84-8; Sup.r-Seniority
for War Veterans Held Unworkable, N. Y. Journ. Commerce, Sept. 20, 1944, p. 1, col. 2;
Aew Laws Aeded to De fine Rights of War Veterans, id., Oct. 7, 1944, p. 1, col. 6; REFL-
PLOYMEN'T OF VETERANS (Industrial Relations Counselors, Monograph No. 68, 1944) 10;
Surrey Shows that Post-war Employment for Returning Soldiers is t7e Mrajor Problem of
Industry, (May 1944) 154 IRON AGE 87; Seniority Bonus, Business Week, Jan. 15, 1944,
p. 90; REEmPLOI.ENT OF V7ETERANS: WITH A PAPER ON MlAN'POWER OUTLOOK (American
Management Association, Personnel Series No. 76, 1944); REPORT ON REF.XI'LOY .ENT OF
EX-SERVICEMEN AND WOMEN, (A. A. R. Comm. for Study of Transportation, June 1944);
Post, The Veterans' Problem: A Challenge and an Opportunity (Nov. 1944) 21 PErsoN E,ZL
126. Many of the current objections to the ambiguities of Section 8 were anticipated in a
memorandum of the NAM during the hearings on the Selective Service Bill. Appendix to
Hearings before Committee on Military Affairs on H. R. 10133, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940)
632-3. Three months before the promulgation of Memorandum 190-A, the VLB's Ship-
building Commission refused a union request for a contract provision that veterans who-,
former jobs were not available should be placed in jobs as nearly comparable as poscible, in
part on the ground that such a clause would lead to a mass reinstatement of men whoze lad:
of aptitude might seriously impair productive efficiency. Sullivan Drydoci: and Repair Co.,
14 WAR LAB. REP. 284 (1944).
Surveys of industry prior to Memorandum 190-A had disclosed a general intention to
rely on seniority as a mitigant of readjustment difficulties. See, e.g., The Seniority Tangle
(April 1944) 102 FACTORY AUhhNAGEMENT AND AMAINTENANCE 82; BAKER, op. cit. supra
note 49, at 64. A study published in June 1944 indicated that "few plant policies match
Selective Service requirements [on absolute priority]." A SuRvEY op EmLOYER POLICIES
ON REEMPLOYMENT OF VETERA-kNS, op. cit. supra note 55, at 1. For analysis of problems of
turnover in the automobile industry, see ACWP SURVEY OF PROBLEMiS RELATING TO THE
RE-EmPLOYMENT OF VETERANS (Automotive Council for War Production Bulletin No. 1,
1944); MANPOWER REPORT No. 42 (Automotive Council for War Production, Oct. 19,
1944). More generally, see EFFECT OF CERTIN PROVISIONS OF SELECTIVE SERVICE LOCAL
BoARD MEMORANDUM. No. 190-A ON THE SENIORITY SYSTEM, op. cit. supra note 57, at 3.
But caveat, other factors than seniority tend to prevent voluntary turnover. Among the-
are wage differentials and merit increases which are unrelated to length-of-service rating.
67. Seenotel6supra.
68. A promising reconaissance has been made, however, in such pamphlets, surveys,
articles and memoranda as those mentioned supra note 66.
69. See supra, pp. 427-9 and notes 39-47.
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TECHNIQUES FOR CIRCUMVENTING THE SPECIAL PRIVILEGES POLICY
By magnifying management's task in reinstating veterans, the doctrine of
special benefits-particularly as embodied in the absolute priority rule-
has brought into prominence those clauses of Section 8 the ambiguity of
which may allow evasion of the duty to rehire.7" It may be expected that
harassed employers will explore the possibilities of three clauses, 'the first
requiring that the veteran "still [be] qualified to perform the duties of [his
position," 71 another making it a valid excuse for failure to reemploy that
"the employer's circumstances have so changed as to make it impossible or
unreasonable to [rehire]," 72 and a third specifying that the position to which
the veteran seeks reinstatement must have been "other than a temporary
[one]." 7
Changes in Condition of the Veteran. The statutory requirement that the
returning veteran still be able to perform his old job was grounded on the
expectation that relatively unchanged individuals would return to former
employment with capacities substantially unimpaired. But with the con-
tinuation of the war two potentially disqualifying types of change in the
serviceman have become increasingly common: loss of skill, and physical or
psychic disabilities incurred in or aggravated by his military experience.
How successful an employer will be in fitting the veteran's loss of skill into
the evasionary clause may turn upon four considerations: the method of
ascertaining the extent to which the veteran's ability has declined, the
burden of demonstrating his present level of capacity, the standard of pro-
ficiency to be set, and the time allowed for meeting whatever norm may be
specified. While quantitative, measures of efficiency are feasible on a pr6duc-
tion line, the diverse situations in which more subjective evaluations, such
as a personnel manager's observations, must be relied on would favor an
employer bent on avoidance of the statute. But even in cases where the
requisite skill is susceptible of measurement, the fact that Section 8 leaves
the question of proof entirely open would seem to enhance the employer's
advantage, since incapacity is more readily proved than capacity. A recent
70. As the war nears a climax, a growing skepticism over the reemployment guaranties
may be expected. See, e.g., remarks of Senator Guffey in introducing a bill to authorize one
year's pay to veterans [S. 675]: "While we have done by legislation what ve possibly could
to assure their return to their pre-war jobs, we must recognize that as a practical matter the
accomplishment of our aim will be impossible." 91 Cong. Rec., March 6, 1945, at 1790-1.
See also When 12 Million Come Home (1944) 11 NEw REPUBLic 707, 708: "The law says
that the returning veteran must get back the job he left to go into the army; but the more
you study this promise, the less it seems to mean." See also Bolt6, The Veterans' Runaround
(1945) 190 HARPER'S 385.
71. Section8(b) (2).
72. Section 8(b) (B). This is the only respect in which the private reemployment pro-





case, Grasso v. Crowhurst,74 in which a veteran who brought suit under the
statute after being refused reinstatement on the strength of this clause was
required by the court to give a visual demonstration of his ability at his
former job illustrates how easily the onus may be shifted to the job claimant.
Moreover, there is little reason to doubt that a mere assertion by a former
employer after a perfunctory mechanical test that the veteran is no longer
qualified for his old job would have equal weight with the latter's claim that
he could have passed an adequate test of skill. This raises the third question:
whether the veteran must meet the same standard of performance as for-
merly. In the opinion of Selective Service, while he may not be rejected be-
cause of inability to meet standards raised in his absence,75 he must still be
qualified to do the "job in the manner in which he did it before he left." '0
If the veteran's present performance is to be assessed in terms of his previous
proficiency, it would seem, finally, that after a comparatively short ab-
sence-as contemplated in Section S-a showing of such ability might fairly
be made a condition precedent to reinstatement, but that after prolonged
military service he should be granted a reasonable time in which to regain
his old ability.
If, instead of alleging loss of skill, the employer challenges the veteran's
physical or psychological capacity, the testimony of company doctors may
supply a more ready support for evasion than the job-trial. In the Grasso
case,7 for example, the plaintiff had been denied reinstatement ostensibly
on the ground that his acquiring flat feet while serving in the armed forces
had incapacitated him for his former work. The burden is thus cast on the
courts of evaluating conflicting medical diagnoses and recommendations.
Whatever assistance the judiciary might have received from the veteran's
service record is apparently ruled out by the Selective Service orders which
make his Report of Separation and medical history confidential.-- Designed
74. Grasso v. Crowhurst, Feb. 15, 1945, 13 U. S. L. WEEK, 2451. Judge Fake dismized
the suit on the ground that plaintiff had not filed an application for reinstatement within
the 40-day period allowed by Section 8(b) (3). Within 40 days after his medical diccharge
from the army, plaintiff had requested an indefinite leave of absence. Upon its refusal by
the company, he applied for reemployment. This second application was within the 90-day
period allowed by an amendment to Section 8 [see note 97 infral which was nut, however,
retroactive.
75. See MEMORANDtUM 190-A, pt. III, § 3 (b). Quacre whether a veteran would con-
tinue for one year to be protected against a discharge because of a new merit.rating system
or of inability to meet new job standards instituted in that period.
76. MEMORANDUM 190-A, pt. III, § 3 (a).
77. See note 74 supra. For an excellent inquiry into the use of physical examinations
and tests of personality and skills as mechanisms for placement rather than as rationaliza-
tions of statutory evasion see BAKER, op. cit. supra note 49, at 80-97. The NLRB has held
that in case of wrongful refusal of reinstatement, there is a presumption that there is a job
which the former employee can perform, with the burden of proving otherwise on the em-
ployer. National Casket Co., 12 N. L. R. B. 165 (1939).
78. MEMORANDU m 190 -A, pt. V, § 3 (a), (b). In a letter dated Sept. 29, 1943, the Chief
of the Reemployment Division stated: "Since the military exit examinations are far more
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to protect the veteran, these rulings may work detriment to him because, in
denying the courts access to the materials for making informed judgments,
they may induce unwarranted dependence upon the testimony of company
doctors. Further, the cloak of secrecy may induce exaggerated inferences by
well-intentioned employers as to the extent of veterans' physical ailments
and thus promote stricter pre-reinstatement examinations. In both cases,
the sound policy that veterans should not be prejudiced by their period of
service is defeated.
Changes in Condition of the Employer's Business. The generality of the
"impossible or unreasonable" clause invites managerial reliance upon it to
support refusals to rehire veterans. But the effect of this clause has been
narrowed by the Selective Service interpretation, already adverted to, that a
reduction of force alone is not sufficient to terminate the employer's duty to
reinstate, 7 and has been cast more generally in doubt by the decision in
Kay v. General Cable Corporation.0 In the Kay case, the plaintiff, having
been denied reinstatement as a company doctor after his honorable discharge
from the Army, petitioned a federal district court under Section 8(e). 1 On
appeal from a dismissal, 2 the defendant argued that, since another physician
had been hired by both the company and an employee's health association,
to reemploy the plaintiff would lessen efficiency, cause loss of working time,
and increase expenses, making his reinstatement "unreasonable" within the
meaning of the statute. The court held that, as it is generally possible for an
employer to find some "reason" for a refusal to reinstate a veteran and as
"unreasonable" means more than "inconvenient or undesirable," acceptance
of the company's reasoning would restrict the veteran's protection "to
merely capricious or arbitrary refusals." 83
It is premature, however, to infer that this decision augurs a strict judicial
scrutiny of efforts to use the escape clause, for, as heretofore indicated, it
reflects the favorable attitude towards veterans ,at the present time when
individual reinstatement claims may be arbitrated without reference to a
thorough than those given by any employer, access by employers to these records is tanta-
mount to saying that the veteran must pass a far more thorough physical examination than
the non-veteran."
79. See supra, p. 42 4 .
80. 144 F. (2d) 653 (C. C. A. 3d, 1944).
81. See note 11 supra.
82. The New Jersey federal district court had dismissed the complaint on the ground
that plaintiff did not hold a position "in the employ of" defendant as required by Sec-
tion 8(b). Judge Kirkpatrick found significance in the fact that the statute does not use the
word "employee," inferring that "in the employ of" covers "employees in superior positions
and those whose services involve special skills." Hence, except for independent contractors
and temporary workers, the statute contemplates "almost every other kind of relationship
in which one person renders regular and continuing service to another." 144 F. (2d) at
655. On this point, see Brief for Appellant, pp. 7-13; Brief for Appellees, pp. 5-10. An
excellent recent study of the various tests of the employment relation is Comment (1944) 32
CAJi.F. L. REv. 289.
83. 144 F. (2d) at 655.
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general employment situation. The implication of the Kay decision that
general business conditions may not be an appropriate referent for the
"impossible or unreasonable" clause would hardly survive the major crises of
reconversion. Hence it may be expected that, as the burden of providing
reemployment becomes more oppressive with general demobilization, this
escape clause will display renewed virility.
There is also a possibility that the clause will be invoked by businesses
undergoing formal or financial reorganization in the post-war period. Its
potentialities in such circumstances, however, are limited, for, while curtail-
ment of the business of war-expanded industries should supply a ground for
exemption from the duty to reinstate, 4 reorganization," dissolution of
partnership,," sale or merger of the business 17 will probably not affect that
obligation since, under the Selective Service rule, the duty runs to successors
in interest.8 By analogy to NLRB practice, responsibility lies with the
employing unit, whatever its legal identity may be.8W 3 Hence, the fact of con-
84. The NLRB has upheld an employer's refusal to reinstate when, because of business
conditions, reinstatement might have compelled a drastic cut in wages. Columbian Iron
Works, Inc., 24 N. L. R. B. 883 (1940). Also when curtailment of businLss has caused elimi-
nation of former jobs. Neuhoff Packing Co., 29 N. L. R. B. 746 (1941). But cf. NLRB v.
Remington-Rand, Inc., 94 F. (2d) 862 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938); cert. denied, 304 U. S. 576 (1933)
(business dislocations which are threatened to result from compliance with a reinstatement
order of the NLRB are no bar to the order); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301
U. S. 1, 46 (1937); NLRB v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 128 F. (2d) 528 (C. C. A. 6th, 1942)
(similarly with other claims of undue hardship, such as exposure to labor strife).
85. For purposes of the Wagner Act, the term "persons" includes ". . . trustees,
trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers." 49 ST.T. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 151 (1940). § 14
states that, if the Act can be validly enforced, it is to prevail over provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Act governing reorganizations. See NLRB v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, 128 F.
(2d) 39 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942), enforcing 20 N. L. R. B. 1100 (1940) ("[The Board's] power must
needs be unembarrassed by an intervening plan of reorganization concerned with the came
employer's liability for its private obligations." Id. at 44). Proceedings under the Wagner
Act are not affected by subsequently filed petition for reorganization under § 77B of Bank-
ruptcy Act. Luchenbach Steaniship Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 181 (1936). A succe-or company is
subject to duties of its predecessor. Sussex Dye & Print Works, Inc., 34 N. L. R. B. 62S
(1941); Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 6 N. L. R. B. 325 (1938); accord, NLRB v. Chattanooga
Bakery, Inc., 127 F. (2d) 201 (C. C. A. 6th, 1942).
86. Where one partner has died, the surviving partner has been held bound by an
NLRB cease-and-desist order. NLRB v. Colten, 105 F. (2d) 179 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939), en-
forcing 6 N. L. R. B. 355 (1938).
87. When a company has committed unfair labor practices, and subsequently merged
with a parent corporation, a cease-and-desist order against its "successors and assigns" is
proper. NLRB'v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 120 F. (2d) 641 (App. D. C. 1941), enforcing 14
N. L. R. B. 539 (1939). A subsidiary's liability for unfair labor practices runs to holding
company after merger. Andrew Jergens Co. of Calif., 43 N. L. R. B. 457 (1942).
88. SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM AN-;. REP. FOR 1941-2, 305-6. The Report states
that, in general, a change in the form of doing business will not impair the veteran's right to
reemployment.
89. See, e.g., NLRB v. Condenser Corp. of America, 128 F. (2d) 67 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942);
NLRB v. Lund, 103 F. (2d) 815 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939); Sun Tent-Luebbert Co., 37 N. L. R. B.
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tinued operation should not be obscured by dissolution of partnerships,
petitions for reorganization, or the chameleon character of parent and sub-
sidiary corporations and affiliated operating companies 0
Expansion of Temporary Employment Category. The deviational Selective
Service pronouncement, already mentioned,"' that those who replace in-
ducted employees are in a "temporary" status and have no reinstatement
rights suggests a third method whereby employers may compensate for the
absolute priority of some veterans by avoiding all obligations to others.
Certain employers have sought to implement the indicated distinction
between "permanent" employees and others thus designated "temporary"
by requiring all hired after a given date to sign temporary employment
agreements as a condition of employment.92 In these it is customarily stated
as understood that the subscribing employee is a substitute for a regular
employee and would not be entitled to reemployment should he enter the
armed services. In the case of NLRB v. Humble Oil and Refining Company,93
the Labor Relations Board had ordered the reinstatement of an employee
50 (1941); Waggoner Refining Co., Inc., 6 N. L. R. B. 731 (1938); Cosmopolitan Shipping
Co., Inc., 2 N. L. R. B. 759 (1937).
90. Compare Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U. S. 197 (1938), aff'g 95 F. (2d)
390 (1938), enforcing 4 N. L. R. B. 71 (1937) (order against parent corporation and affiliated
operating companies involved); see NLRB v. Hearst, 102 F. (2d) 658 (1939), enforcing as
modified 2 N. L. R. B. 530 (1937) (order was directed against William Randolph Hearst as
well as three holding companies); Bethlehem Steel Corp: v. NLRB, 120 F. (2d) 641 (App.
D. C. 1941); Bussmann Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 111 F. (2d) 783 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940); NLRB v.
Union Drawn Steel Co., 109 F. (2d) 587 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940) (parent corporation exercised
complete control over subsidiary corporations); Todd Shipyards Corp., 5 N. L. R. B, 20
(1938) (holding company controlled subsidiary corporations); Fisher Body Corp., 7 N. L.
R. B. 1083 (1938); Middle Vest Corp., 10 N. L. R. B. 618 (1938); Republic Steel Corp.,
9 N. L. R. B. 219 (1938) (central direction of labor policies); Art Crayon Co., Inc., 7 N. L.
R. B. 102 (1938); Hudson Knitting Mills, Inc., 56 N. L. R. B. 1250 (1944) (interlocking
directorates); NLRB v. De Bardeleben, 135 F. (2d) 13 (C. C. A. 5th, 1943) (successor part-
nership continued family-owned organization). But cf. Jamestown Metal Equipment Co.,
Inc., 17 N. L. R. B. 813 (1939) (parent corporation held not liable for subsidiary's refusal to
bargain collectively); South Carolina Granite Co., 58 N. L. R. B., No. 254 (Oct. 28, 1944)
(holding company not liable for unfair labor practices of subsidiary whose policies it did not
control); accord, Utah Copper Co., 7 N. L. R. B. 928 (1938).
A Board order against "successors and assigns" is improper when it includes good-faith
successors and assigns. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. NLRB, 135 F. (2d) 891 (C. C. A. 7th,
1943); NLRB v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 133 F. (2d) 295 (C. C. A. 6th, 1943); NLRB v.
Bachelder, 125 F. (2d) 387 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942). Cf. Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB,
315 U. S. 100, 106 (1942) (". . . a bona fide discontinuance and a true change of owner-
ship . . .would terminate the duty of reinstatement creafed by the Board's order...").
91. Seesupra, p.436.
92. Before the absolute priority rule was enunciated management had little disposition
to distinguish those who had replaced inducted workers from others, on the theory that rela-
tive seniority would govern the reinstatement rights of all veterans. See BArR, op. cit.
supra note 49, at 64; A SURVEY OF EMPLOYER POLICIES ON REEMPLOYMENT or VETERANS,
op. cit. supra note 55, a t 1-2.
93. 140 F. (2d) 777 (C. C. A. 5th, 1944).
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who had signed such a "temporary employment" form and who, after an
illegal discharge, had been drafted. 94 The Court of Appeals, in sustaining the
order, indicated that since the Board must be supposed to have knovn that
the injured employee's rights under the Selective Service Act were subordi-
nate to those of permanent workers then in the armed forces, it could not
have conferred upon him any reemployment rights antagonistic to it.5
Though this rationale does not go as far as the Selective Service rule under
which the employee who replaces a drafted worker has no statutory reem-
ployment rights at all, it lends support to what may become-in cases where
similar positions have had a series of incumbents-an important tool of
evasion.
CONCLUSIONS AiN\D Ri-ECOMMIENDATIONS
The policy of a special reemployment equity for veterans is incompatible
with organized labor's interest in union and job security, with manage-
ment's interest in minimizing dislocations through sound personnel prac-
tices, and with the general public interest in an orderly transition to a peace
economy. Such a standard, moreover, seems to promise no compensating
security even for the veteran. In view, therefore, of Selective Service's
intransigent hostility to present seniority rules and collective bargaining
arrangements which might block the veteran's assertion of superior preroga-
tives, merely to render the application of absolute priority more effective
and predictable by plugging statutory loopholes is not a desirable goal.
Even should a wiser reinstatement policy-such as the accrual of seniority
while in service 2 -be read into Section 8, substantive statutory changes
may still be necessary to checkmate unconscionable refusals to rehire and to
broaden the scope of employment opportunities for the returning veteran.
Under the present statute, an employer's inability to furnish reemployment
within the ninety-day period allowed for application 17 exonerates him from
94. 48 N.L.R.B. 1118,1138(1943).
95. "[The employment contract] but announced the relative rights of the contracting
parties under and in harmony with the policy of the Selective Service Act. The order of the
Board takes cognizance of these provisions and does not confer upon [the employee] any
rights antagonistic thereto." 140 F. (2d) at 779-SO.
96. Seenote l6supra.
97. MEmORA I Dm 190-A, pt. III, § 2(b): "While the employer cannot . . . extend the
40-day period, he can voluntarily reemploy the veteran thereafter...." The original
40-day grace has been extended by amendment to 90 days after discharge from the armed
forces or from the hospital, provided that hospitalization is for not more than one year.
Pub. L. No. 473, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (Dec. 8, 1944). "Rehabilitation leave" has been
granted both by union agreement and voluntary company arrangement in a number of
instances. See The Reinstatement of Draftees (1942) 11 LAB. REL. REP. 133.
A forewarning of the emotional opposition which even substantive changes will en-
counter was the response to a recommendation to Congress by the then War Mobilization
and Reconversion Director Byrnes that Section 8 required "clarification." N. Y. Times,
April 1, 1945, p. 28, col. 5. Spokesmen for the VFW and the American Legion perceived in
this a threat to the supposed statutory guarantee of absolute priority for veterans, and cer-
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further obligation to the veteran, and a subsequent offer of employment
would entail no statutory duties. Similarly, the veteran's acceptance of
interim employment elsewhere would deprive him of all claim to his former
employment.9" The equitable consideration that a temporary inability to
rehire should not conclude management's liability is supported by the sug-
gestion in the one-year protection against discharge without cause 0 that a
right to suitable employment also continues for that period; and a precedent
is supplied by the carefully drafted British reemployment statute which
provides for the veteran's retention of reinstatement rights by periodic
application."'0 Further, the NLRB's interpretations of an employer's duty
to rehire after discriminatory discharges may provide a fruitful reference.
Thus, the Board requires the enrollment on a "preferential list" of em-
ployees who cannot be reinstated be6ause of reduction in force, 10 1 regards a
management closing a plant with intent to reopen as an "employer" having
the continuing duty to rehire under the Wagner Act,102 and insists upon the
retention of reemployment rights by discriminatorily discharged workers
who take interim jobs.10 3 It is true that the partially punitive nature of the
tain segments of the press interpreted the proposal as an effort of the administration to
"renege" on its earlier promises.
98. Thus, a veteran who is discharged from the armed forces while the war continues
and who respondsto various pressures to take a war job rather than return to his former non-
essential employment would have no reinstatement rights if he did not apply within 90
days.
In the United Kingdom, veterans who, upon discharge from the armed forces, are di-
rected into war work other than their former employment do not lose their reemployment
rights. INT. LAB. OFFICE, THE ORGANIZATION OF EiPLOYMENT IN TnE TRANSITION FROM
WAR TO' PEACE (1944) 16. According to Selective Service, there is no retention of such
rights by servicemen who were transferred to the Enlisted Reserve Corps at their request
to engage in essential occupations and did not apply for reinstatement in their old jobs
within the statutory period. MEMORANDUM 190-A, pt. V, § 2. This has been rationalized
on the ground that "[the veteran] has . . .elected to take [such] employment ... for the
purpose of securing his release from active duty or service in the armed forces." VETERANS'
EMPLOWMENT SERVICE, NEWS LETTER (Jan.-Feb. 1944) 5.
99. Section 8(c), supra note 10.
100. Reinstatement in Civil Employment Act, 1944, 7 & 8 GEo. VI, c. 15, § 1(2), (3).
The veteran retains his eligibility for reemployment by renewing his application at intervals
of not more than thirteen weeks, although the employer's duty to rehire ceases "after six
months have elapsed from the end of the present emergency." Id. at § 1(2) (b).
101. See 3 NLRB ANN. REP. (1939) 201; 6 NLRB ANN. REP. (1942) 77.
102. Hoosier Veneer Co., 21 N. L. R. B. 907, 935 (1940). The significance of such a rule
in a period when many plants will be shut down for retooling can hardly be overestimated.
103. The Board has ordered a reinstatement offer even when the employee, after a dis-
criminatorydischarge, has obtained "substantiallyequivalent employment" elsewhere. Eagle-
Picher Mining & Smelting Co., 16 N. L. R. B. 727 (1939); 5 NLRB ANN. REP, (1941) 73; 7
NLRB ANN. REP. (1943) 51. However, in at least one case, this order has been grounded
on the theory that loss of seniority rights has made the interim not really "substantially
equivalent." Carlisle Lumber Co., 7 N. L. R. B. 332 (1938). The validity of a reinstatement
in these circumstances has been upheld. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 331 U.S. 177 (1941);
Continental Oil Co. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 212 (1941); accord, NLRB v. Van Deusen, 138 F.
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NLRB's reinstatement orders limits the appropriateness of the analogy;
yet even if we adopt the limited theory that the veteran is entitled only to a
restoration of the status qw, it wotild seem that he deserves at least the same
measure of job protection as a striking employee. Accordingly, the failure of
Section 8 to follow the lead of foreign legislation in requiring that the em-
ployer offer the next most favorable employment I04 when an equivalent job
is not available seems to limit needlessly the range of opportunities for the
veteran.
However, even if a more enlightened and feasible reemployment doctrine
and method should be evolved and even if the more glaring statutory ambi-
guities and omissions should be cured by amendment, it is doubtful whether
machinery now provided is adequate to enforce veterans' reinstatement
rights. Authority to force compliance on recalcitrant employers is vested by
Section 8 in the federal district courts.Qi But resort to litigation, even
should the veteran have the necessary resources, is unsatisfactory both be-
cause the courts lack the expert competence required to adjudicate many of
the issues which are bound to arise and because the non-continuing nature
of the judicial process disqualifies it for formulating a pattern of reemploy-
ment policy. While it is conceivable that the courts will impose a voluntary
limit on their own fact-finding powers and delegate them to internal indus-
trial government,105 the main task of administration will inevitably devolve
upon some public agency. The failure of Selective Service to develop suffi-
cient expertise in industrial relations, its intractable adherence to an ill-
advised reemployment formula and its consequent alienation of the confi-
dence of affected groups would seem to unfit it for this responsibility. In
(2d) 893 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943). Contra: NLRB v. Weirton Steel Co., 135 F. (2d) 494 (C. C. A.
3d, 1943); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 113 F. (2d) 202 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940): NLRB v.
Botany Worsted Mills, 106 F. (2d) 263 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939); NLRB v. Carlisle Lumber Co., 99
F. (2d) 533 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938).
104. (United Kingdom) Reinstatement in Civil Employment Act, 1944, 7 & 8 GEo. VI,
c. 15, § 1(b); (Canada) Reinstatement in Civil Employment Act, 1942, 6 GEo. VI, C. 31,
§ 4(c). See Couper, Seniority and Reemployment of Veterans in E'aLoyErn REsro~: si LiT
FOR VETERAN REEMPLOTMENT (Am. Management Ass'n, Personnel Ser. No. 83,1944) 46,43.
105. See notes 11, 12 supra.
106. See notes 42, 43 supra. An increasing awareness that present arrangements were
unsatisfactory found expression in the Baruch-Hancock Report which deplored the "pres-
ent . . . scattering of efforts on the part of many agencies to plan for the veterans' return"
and urged the integration of placement programs with other manpower controls. RL-rorm
ON WAR AND POST-VAR ADJUSTMENT POLICIES (1944) 5-6. The Retraining and Reemploy-
ment Administration, created by Executive Order No. 9427 on Feb. 24, 1944, and sanctioned
by The War Mobilization and Reconversion Act of 1944 [Pub. L. No. 458, 78th Cong., 2d
Sess. (Oct. 3, 1944); see H. R. REP. No. 1902, 78th Cong., 2d Sesss. (1944) ] has thus far
failed to implement its mandate to coordinate and supervise the activities of federal pgencies
dealing with manpower problems. See Pub. L. No. 458, § 302. See Bolt6, TmE VETrRAS'
RuNAnouND (1945) 190 HARPER'S 385. Instead, the RRA, in setting up veterans' referral
centers, has revealed a disposition to segregate the reemployment of veterans from the gen-
eral reconversion problem. See RRA, Order No. 1 (Mlay 17, 1944).
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view of the explosive potentialities of intra-labor strife which is dramatized
in the reemployment issue, the NLRB, with a broad experience accumulated
in a decade of acute industrial stress," 7 may be competent to represent the
public interest in administering the veterans' reinstatement statute.108 Al-
though it is conceivable that placing veterans under the jurisdiction of an
agency known to be pro-labor 109 might weaken the Board's public support
and foster the very frictions that it was designed to obviate, yet it may be
desirable to effect a coordination of the interests of veterans and of the
unions within an agency dedicated to the promotion of collective bargaining.
107. See 1-8 NLRB ANN. REPS., passim.
108. Caveat, the Labor Federal Security Appropriation Act of 1944 [57 STAT. 4941
sharply restricted the Board's use of the funds allotted to it under that statute. For critical
discussion, see 8 NLRB ANN. REP. (1944) 6-10.
109. "The major function of the Board . . . has continued to be the protection of tle
basic statutory rights of workers to organize and bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing." 8 NLRB ANN. REP. (1944) 1.
